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When Paul I came to the throne in 1796, Malta and Russia had long had 
a common enemy. It was the Ottoman Empire, its Muslim Turks, and 
its Barbary corsairs. Unlike Malta, a central Mediterranean archipelago 
with well-protected, deep-water harbours, Russia had been a largely 
landlocked country whose territorial expansion historically had tended 
to be across internal frontiers, from Kiev to Muscovy to Kazan. With the 
advent of Peter I, however, and especially after his declaration of war 
against Turkey and the acquisition of the Black Sea port of Azov in 1696, 
Russia began to nurture a naval and maritime policy. This policy was 
two-pronged: to the North in the struggle with Sweden for access to the 
Baltic; to the South in the long drawn out confrontations with the Turks 
in their extensive domains, hemming Russia in from the Mediterranean, 
and indeed from the Black Sea. 
Paul I's keen interest in Malta and its Catholic, aristocratic order 
of chivalry, must be seen in the light of a string of earlier acquaintances, 
overtures and schemes of mutual interest between the Czars of 
Russia, on one hand, and the Knights of Malta, on the other. Two of 
his best known predecessors, Peter I (1672-1725) and Catherine II 
(1729-1796), already had set their sights on Malta, its knights and, not 
least, its famous fleet. Given the new-found commitment to naval and 
maritime undertakings, Petrine Russia now had an ideological as well 
as a strategic shared interest with the Mediterranean headquarters of 
the anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim crusaders. 
From Russia's point of view, this interest was also technical and 
. professional, in so far as the successful equipment, organization and 
the leadership of its own Russian fleet was concerned. This made 
sense, too, in the context of the Western expertise and support which 
both Peter and Catherine sought, coveted and to an extent emulated, 
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as a matter of policy. Apart from their own intrinsic merits, development 
and advancement were needed for Russia if she was to compete 
meaningfully and to restrain any adversaries, be these Swedes, Turks 
or Poles. 
The Grand Masters, no less than the Czars, had an interest in 
furthering this growing relationship, constrained though they were by an 
imposed Western European policy of 'neutrality' in foreign affairs (except 
for fighting the Infidel), and generally by a statutory adherence to Roman 
Catholicism, the Pope being the Order of St John's spiritual head. But 
Russia was, of course, a Christian country, and an anti-Turkish one at 
that. Moreover it became increasingly, from Peter's time onwards, one 
of the 'Great Powers' on the continental chess-board, a position further 
assured to it by Catherine 11. 
When the victorious boyar general Boris Scheremetyev, who 
had planned the Azov campaign, arrived in Valletta's Grand Harbour 
from Rome, as Peter I's emissary, in 1698, the Spanish Grand Master 
Ramon Perellos had him met by a high-level caravan at sea and had a 
gilded carriage awaiting him ashore, together with a procession of pine 
torches and a platoon of guards. In the Order's magnificent conventual 
church during the feast of Pentecost on 18th May, Scheremetyev 
sat below the Grand Master under his baldacchin at High Mass and, 
much moved, he prostrated himself before the sacred relic of St John 
the Baptist, the Order's protector. On the following day, Grand Master 
Perellos reciprocated gifts in style when, in the Great Hall of the Council 
in Va 11 etta , he awarded Scheremetyev the accolade and Gold Cross of 
Devotion, with permission to wear it upon his shield or banner when 
fighting against the Turks. This (so far, very rare) Russian visitor thus 
became "the first Russian Grand Cross of the Knights Hospitaller".2 He 
would hardly be the last. 
Czar Peter I's interests were not that chivalrous, as Czar Paul I's 
may have largely been later. His instructions to Scheremetyev were to 
check out Malta's fleet and fortifications, and indeed formally to suggest 
to Perellos a combined Russo-Maltese operation against the Turks (as 
he duly did). But pomp, pageantry and ceremony mattered no less than 
the great cause at hand; the more so since France had mended its 
fences with the Porte. 
France was a lingering background factor in Russo-Maltese 
relations for three main reasons: first, its eastern Mediterranean 
diplomacy and the growing commerce with it, which influenced Peter I; 
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second, its Enlightenment and subsequent revolution, which influenced 
Catherine 11; and third, its revolutionary and territorial wars,supposedly 
following from the new 'egalitarian' philosophy of liberation, anti-
aristocratic, anti-monarchical and anticlerical, which largely influenced 
Paul I in an opposite direction, although perhaps not altogether, given 
his bad treatment of the Russian nobility. 
The French presence and policy put the Knights of Malta in a 
cleft stick situation: most of the Knights were French and many of the 
Order's estates were in France, but the French Revolution had seen 
their confiscation, thereby impoverishing the Order, while. the ideas it 
promoted went smack against what the Order was and had traditionally 
stood for since its foundation by the Blessed Gerard in the early 12th 
century to protect Christian pilgrims in the Holy Land. Not unlike the 
Templars, the Teutonic Knights and some other religiously-inspired 
Christian orders of chivalry, the Knights Hospitallers took vows of 
poverty, celibacy and obedience in the monastic tradition, but they were 
not estranged from the ways of the world. Although it seems Muslims 
and Jews were not excluded from treatment in their hospitals, they had 
strict codes of ethics and were brothers-in-arms in the crusade against 
the Muslim menace.3 
After the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin, the Muslim sultan, in 1187, the 
Knights repaired to Acre, from where they eventually moved to Rhodes, 
until driven out by the Ottomans in 1522. For nearly three centuries, 
they made of Malta in the central Mediterranean their main fort and 
bastion, stopping the Muslim advance westwards, most spectacularly 
in the Great Siege of Malta of 1565, and solely or jointly they repeatedly 
participated in forays against the Ottoman Empire, such as at the Battle 
of Lepanto, against the Moors and Barbary corsairs, from the sixteenth 
to the eighteenth century. They were less poor and pious by then in their 
courtly swagger and swashbuckling attire, moving around their splendid 
baroque buildings decorated with the finest painting, marble sculpture 
and gilded treasure; but they had held their ground until the cataclysm 
unleashed by the French revolution and the outstanding general which 
this eventually threw up, with his sights set on a domination extending 
from Paris to Cairo, to London, to Moscow, ~md still further beyond. 
Several French knights felt, foremost among them the well-connected 
Bosredon de Ransijat, that they had joined the Order to fight the infidel, 
not their countrymen: their deeds showed it well enough when they 
reneged in 1798, as Bonaparte's fleet surrounded Malta's harbours.4 
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Czarina Catherine 11, Paul I's mother, was, like Peter I, much 
interested, in Malta and the Order of St John. In 1770, during the 
first Russo-Turkish War, Catherine tried and failed to persuade the 
Portugese Grand Master, Pinto, to allow the Russian fleet to use Maltese 
ports. In 1788, during another Russo-Turkish conflict, the French Grand 
Master de Rohan refused to allow Maltese galleys to cooperate with the 
Russian navy in its attacks on the Turkish fleets. Clearly, the Knights of 
Malta would not be drawn into an alliance with a non-Catholic power in a 
war against the decaying Ottoman Empire, when French commerce with 
the Near East was prospering, and the old Catholic-Muslim battle-lines 
certainly were not as drawn as they had used to be in the previous two 
centuries. 
The Order was ready and willing to assist the Czarina in the 
technical business of training and organizing her fleets, however. Both 
Grand Master Pinto, in 1770, and Grand Master de Rohan, in 1789 (the 
year of the French Revolution) agreed to help Russia out in this. To train 
a squadron of Russian galleys, as requested by Catherine, de Rohan 
sent one of his rising stars, Count Giulio Litta. A handsome 25 year old 
Milanese who was Captain of the Magistral galley, the young knight 
dazzled Catherine, who went out of her way to compliment him. He was 
received, too, by the Czarevich Paul. Litta, the youngest general in the 
Russian service, immediately distinguished himself, particularly by his 
determining attack on the Swedish flagship at the Battle of Svenskund 
in 1790. Giulio Litta had a brother, Lorenzo, then a monsignore but, like 
him, on the up and up. Both would figure prominently on the Russian 
scene, especially after 1796, during Paul I's reign. 
Catherine's interest in Malta went further than Peter's. She wanted 
a full diplomatic rapport, with an accredited ambassador in Valletta. She 
hoped, according to one British historian, "to turn Malta into a Russian 
satellite", employing agents and spies to establish a pro-Russian party. 
Those in Russian employ, under Russian influence of one kind or 
another or sympathetic to it, in the last quarter of the 18th century, would 
have included the likes of Cavalcabo, Psaro, Zahra, Lorenzi, and some 
.others. Although the Order refrained from granting Russia full diplomatic 
status, a consular presence was established effectively nonetheless. A 
charmer when she wanted, Catherine was not easily deterred. With the 
Marquis Cavalcabo in 1770, she sent the vain Grand Master Pinto a 
flamboyant full-length portrait of herself, executed in oils by the Russian 
artist Dmitri Levitzki (1735-1822), and accompanied by a poem lauding the 
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Grand Master. Pinto acceded to Admiral Sergius Babinkoffs proposition 
that Russian naval officers should complete their training on the Order's 
ships, and loaned him two of his knights, one of them being the Count 
Michele Sagramoso, to assist in the Russian fleet's reorganisation. 
Sagramoso, who attracted Catherine's attention, was involved in the 
Warsaw negotiations between 1773 and 1776 for the return of the Ostrog 
estates, which had been willed to the Order by a Polish nobleman in 1609, 
and their transformation into a Polish Priory with several commanderies 
and a very considerable annual revenue for the Order. 5 Athough Valletta 
could not be allowed to become a Russian naval base or a warehouse 
for her provisions, Russian ships were graciously permitted to victual at 
Malta from time to time. A Russian naval hospital was dedicated to the 
Knights, and the eight-pointed cross raised above it. 6 
During the years he spent in Malta, the Czarina's envoy Cavalcabo 
received his instructions directly from Count Panin, who headed the 
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St Petersburg, and who also acted 
as a tutor to the future Czar Paul I. To this day, Levitzki's attractive and 
imposing Czarina, conveyed to Malta by Cavalcabo, hangs on display in 
the 'state rooms' of the President's Palace in Valletta.7 
The plot thickens during the reign of Paul I, which lasted from 1796 
to 1801. Paul became Czar at the age of 42 after a traumatic childhood: 
his father had been murdered; his mother was not conspicuous for 
her maternal instincts. In the aftermath of the French revolution, the 
guillotine and regicide, Europe was in the grip of the Napoleonic wars 
on land and at sea, shifting alliances and counter-alliances, new ideas 
and uncertain futures. 
In his own way, Paul was a romantic, even an idealist, although 
power apparently soon went to his head, as it usually does. A fixed 
pOint in the compass was, for him, the Order of St John. The Knights 
of Malta epitomized a good old-fashioned ethos, chivalry, refinement, 
gentlemanly manners, which he felt deserved to have a sobering 
effect on the fast changing world around him, a world seemingly 
gone mad. Now the Knights had been evicted unceremoniously 
from Malta by General Bonaparte on his way to Egypt, with a huge 
fleet, in June 1798, bypassing Nelson's fleet off Sardinia. Under 
an uninspiring Austrian Grand Master, von Hompesch, abandoned 
by several of his own knights, they had surrendered without much 
of a fight, and left, with Hompesch repairing to Trieste. Three 
months after their arrival in Malta, however, the French troops were 
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themselves besieged and sheltering behind the walls, as a result 
of a popular armed insurrection by the Maltese inhabitants, who on 
the whole had not taken kindly to their newly-arrived, demanding, 
demeaning and generally lawless republican masters. 
Czar Paul I was concerned. He was interested. He was adamant. 
How could such a noble, Christian, age-old European institution be 
allowed to come to grief like that? What would become of it? Who would 
lead it? What would happen to its remaining properties, its revenues? 
Where would it be based? Why should the Island of the Knights, which 
stricti juris belonged to Naples, fall to France? Or go to Britain? Why not 
Russia? What was the world coming to? 
Paul had long been a fan of the Knights. Giulio Utta, who became 
a confidante and adviser of his, wrote to Cardinal Doria saying that 
the Knights of St John had been an object of palpitating interest to 
Paul "dalla sua piu' tenera infanzia".8 In his youth he had been much 
impressed by a voluminous work about the history of the Order of St 
John by the Abbe' Rene' Aubert de Vertot, published in French in 1726 
and translated into English two years later. 9 His tutor Panin saw nothing 
but a boy's innocuous foolishness in Paul's gesture when, having read 
this book, he decided to be a Grand Master, or pretended to have 
become one, "a purple bed curtain answering for a cloak".1o 
On becoming czar, Paul went out of his way to endear himself 
to the Order, lavishly endowing it with proceeds from the captured 
Polish Priory, which in January 1797 he officially transformed, and 
soon reinforced, as the Grand Priory of Russia, with a special uniform 
designed for Russian knights. As a result of the partitions of Poland 
in the mid-1790s, the Order's Grand Priory on Polish territory, and all 
its revenues, had become Russian property, just when the Order's 
dignity and income had been suffering one blow after another due to 
the confiscation of its estates on the continent by republican France. 
Proceeds from this to the Order's Casa del Comun Tesoro in Valletta 
amounted to 300,000 crowns. The Pope, if only as the Order's spiritual 
head, was not less interested. Lorenzo Utta, Giulio's brother, was 
summoned from Warsaw to be the Apostolic Nuncio at St Petersburg. 
Both the Grand Master and the Pope wooed the Czar, who was led to 
believe that his chance to shine had come. It was agreed that Czar Paul 
I would become the 'Protector' of the Order of St John conjointly with the 
Holy Roman Emperor and the King of the Two Sicilies. 
Received in audience by the Czar on 29th November 1797, Giulio 
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De Utta, in his capacity as the Order's 'Ambassador Extraordinary', 
acquainted His Imperial Majesty "with the universal wish of the whole 
Order that you would deign to become chief of this establishment, and 
accept a title so dear, and so encouraging to us all", the title being that of 
"Protector of the Order of Malta". As a token of gratitude and recognition, 
the Grand Master and Supreme Council of the Order sent Paul, through 
De Utta, "the Ancient Cross of the celebrated La Vallette, that invincible 
defender of our Island who bequeathed his name to a city which he alone 
has rendered impregnable" .. 'This cross", De Litta added, "has hitherto 
been religiously preserved in the treasury of our Cathedral Church, as a 
precious monument, which constantly recalled to our remembrance the 
glorious military exploits performed by a Grand Master of Malta, who 
might properly be termed the Hero of Christianity; and now we feel a 
pleasure in offering it to your Imperial Majesty, as a proof of our gratitude, 
as a mark worthy of his piety, and as a happy presage of the renewal 
of our prosperity".11 Nine months later (26th August 1798), in a protest 
against the same but by now humiliated Hompesch and his knightly 
entourage, we find the Grand Priory of Russia describing Bonaparte's 
invading republicans as "banditti a hundred times more infidel than 
those against whom the duties of their profession armed them".12 
Much had changed within the space of a year. Unfortunately the 
text of a treaty being carried to Valletta from St Petersburg by a Polish 
knight, in connection with Paul's patronage, fell into Napoleon's hands at 
Ancona. When the French took over Malta in June 1798 the first person 
to be booted out was Russia's resident ambassador, Antoine O'Hara: "in 
an hour!", he was told. 13 
Russia joined the coalition against France. In the summer 
of 1797, while Malta's republican takeover was being planned in 
Paris and Toulon, following upon the French occupation of Corfu' 
and the other Ionian Islands, Russia dispatched a fleet to the 
Mediterranean under Admiral F. F. Uschakov to check and counter 
French expansionism eastwards, to protect the Bosphorus and the 
Dardanelles.14 Various exchanges, understandings and treaties now 
ensued between Russia, Naples, Britain and other powers uniting 
against the seemingly unstoppable French advances, with Russia 
formally joining the second anti-French 'Coalition' formed by Britain, 
Naples, Portugal and Turkey in January 1799, which Austria also 
joined. Russia's resentment of France had the better even of its 
traditional adversity towards Turkey. 
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While the allies generally recognized that strategically Malta had 
to be wrenched out of French hands, what Paul I was more bent upon 
actually was, as it turned out, himself becoming the Grand Master of the 
Order. This prospect presented itself more clearly once Grand Master 
Hompesch was being held to have betrayed the Order, by giving in to 
the French Republic too readily and scurrying away to Trieste under 
Austria's wing. Ironically, the inertia blamed on Malta's first and last 
Austrian Grand Master, Hompesch, had been induced partly by his 
gratuitous belief that Russia, among others, would come to his aid and 
thus prevent the Order's expulsion. In fact, a number of knights had 
sought asylum in St Petersburg. In August 1798 the knights of what 
was now the Russian Grand Priory, who were by no means fully or 
legitimately representative of the Order as such, denounced his alleged 
betrayal and announced that they regarded him as "deposed from the 
rank to which we raised him". No longer obliged to obey him, they threw 
themselves into arms of their "august and sovereign Protector, Paul I, 
Emperor of all the Russias". Dependent as he was on Austrian asylum, 
Hompesch was nudged into an abdication in July 1799 by Emperor 
Francis 11, to whom it was far more important that the Russian army in 
Italy be not withdrawn. The relic of St John the Baptist, before which 
a century earlier a Russian boyar had bowed at St John's cathedral in 
Va11 etta, was despatched to St Petersburg, where it arrived in October, 
and it was an exultant czar who now bowed before it - in the chapel of 
the imperial palace at Gatchina. 15 
Paul I's declaration of 13th November 1798 began thus: 
"We, by the Grace of God, Paul I, Emperor and Autocrat of 
All the Russias, in consideration of the wish expressed to 
us by the Bailiffs, Grand-Crosses, Commanders, Knights of 
the Illustrious Order of St John of Jerusalem, of the Grand 
Priory of Russia, and other members assembled together 
in our capital, in the name of all the well-intentioned part of 
their Confraternity, we accept the title of Grand Master of 
this Order, and renew on this occasion the solemn promises 
we have already made in quality of Protector, not only to 
preserve all the institutions and privileges of this Illustrious 
Order for ever unchanged in regard to the free exercise of 
its Religion, with everything relating to the Knights of the 
Roman Catholic faith, and the jurisdiction of the Order, the 
seat of which we have fixed in our Imperial residence; but 
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we also declare that we will unceasingly employ for the 
future all our care and attention for the augmentation of the 
Order, for its re-establishment in the respectable situation 
which is due to the salutary end of its institution for assuring 
its solidity, and continuing its utility ... "16 
Unfortunately for the Czar, who had himself elected Grand Master 
of the Order during an extraordinary meeting of the Russian Grand 
Priory on 7th November 1798, and.a few weeks later crowned by the 
Archbishop of Thebes, Pope Pius VI was prepared to accept him as the 
Order's protector but not as its Grand Master. In Roderick Cavaliero's 
words: "the Knights of St Petersburg elected a Greek schismatic as 
head of a Roman Catholic order, an honorary Grand Cross who had 
never been a Knight, a married man who had taken none of the vows of 
poverty, chastity".17 Married, and with mistresses, he might have added; 
but that would not have scandalized some who had indeed taken such 
vows. Among the first to taste Paul's anger at this papal non-compliance 
were the Litta brothers, who quickly fell from grace. 
Although Paul's attachment to the Order certainly preceded the 
French takeover and the Maltese insurrection in 1798, which lasted two 
years, it came to coincide with an unsettled state of affairs in Malta, 
when sovereign title to the country itself was in question. Russia thus 
became more than ever embroiled in the 'Malta Question', one that 
mostly interested France, Britain, Naples, the Order of St John, and of 
course Russia. Russia's naval presence in the Mediterranean and the 
capture of Corfu' in March 1799 by Ushankov made the plot thicken 
further, especially in the eyes of some leading British admirals and 
captains, including Nelson, who strongly suspected that Russia was 
planning to take Malta. London was more cautious and more diplomatic, 
since Russian cooperation in the wars against France was appreciated, 
but what happened in the periphery did not always correspond to what 
was decreed in the metropolis. Having been duly warned accordingly, 
Nelson actually wrote to the Russian Admiral Ushcakov on 25th 
September 1799, who had dropped anchor at Palermo earlier that 
month, saying that he would "rejoice most cordially when we go against 
Malta" for he was satisfied that it was not to be taken (from France) 
"without more force against it". Admiral Nelson also wrote a long letter to 
Czar Paul I saying that Britain had no designs on Malta: she supported 
the Sicilian claim over it. This was in line with an understanding that 
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the Order .should return and with a convention signed in St Petersburg 
on 29th December 1798 by the British Ambassador Whitworth and the 
Russian Chancellor Woronzow. Upon its surrender Malta would be 
given a garrison supplied by Britain, Naples and Russia, who would 
hold the Island on behalf of the Order. Orders were in the pipeline for a 
Russian contingent of some 3,000 troops to be sent to Malta to assist 
the Maltese in reducing Valletta under the command of Prince Dimitri 
Volkonski. 18 
In December 1799 the Czar's minister at Palermo, Chevalier 
Italinsky, arrived in order to coordinate allied measures after Malta had 
been restored to the Order. He met with Maltese representatives of the 
towns and villages, explaining the position. Russia would be sending 
troops to help the Maltese and a Russian commandant or governor. 
In adviSing about the allocation of quarters, Italinsky would have the 
Russian contingent stationed in the fortified capital city, a proposition 
to which the anti-Russian British officer-in-charge, Sir Alexander Ball, 
strongly objected. Ball, who dearly wished to be the governor himself, 
did everything in his power to discourage Russian interest and a Russian 
presence in Malta, realising no doubt that if the Order returned, there was 
a pretender in waiting as its leader, one who was also the ruler of Russia, 
whatever the Pope might say. In January 1799 a bold but unsuccessful 
attempt to assault the French garrison from within the walls of Valletta 
had been masterminded by a former corsair and colonel in the Russian 
service, Lorenzi, together with a Catholic priest and some others, who 
had been arrested and executed by the French.19 Had Lorenzi planned 
to raise the Russian flag on the ramparts? Suspicions of this kind were 
not wanting, as each power sought pretexts, real or imagined, whereby 
to strengthen its hand in the eventual power-sharing arrangement over 
Malta. Anglo-Russian relations deteriorated to such an extent that in 
February 1800 the British ambassador was was asked to leave St 
Petersburg. In July 1800, disappointed by rewards for his exertions, 
Paul would be prompted to abandon the Second Coalition at least partly 
because Napoleon had tactfully offered him Malta, together with the 
release of 6,000 Russian prisoners in Holland, who could form Malta's 
garrison.2o In December of the same year, by which time Britain had 
taken hold of Malta (excluding Naples, Russia and indeed the Maltese 
representatives from the capitulation), Russia joined Denmark, Sweden 
and Russia in a treaty of 'armed neutrality'. Paul I was hardly 'neutral' 
towards Britain. In reaction to his and the Order's exclusion from Britain's 
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new acquisition in the Mediterranean, Grand Master, garrison and all, he 
placed an embargo on all British ships in Russian ports, practically closing 
the Baltic to British commerce. In the British press, the Russian czar was 
denigrated as 'Crazy Paul' and caricatured as a bear; but the British would 
not give in easily to his demands or his blackmail. 21 
If Paul I really wanted to take Malta, not simply to be the 
Order's Grand Master, he probably lost his best chance when Admiral 
Ushakov's fleet, with 2,000 troops abroad, never set foot on the island, 
and never sailed there, deployed instead in Sicilian and subsequently 
in Aegean waters. It was expected, even awaited, and its would-be 
arrival used by Ball to try and force the French to surrender; but it 
never arrived, perhaps fearing a double deal, or regarding the Aegean 
presence as more vital. It has been suggested that Ushakov's Black 
Sea fleet did not go because it was in disrepair but, as Gregory has 
noted, why it never set sail for Malta in any weather remains something 
of a mystery. Circumstances - political and personal - prevented the 
blockading British fleet from being omni-present in Maltese waters, 
but whenever the blockade slackened some French supply vessel was 
likely to reach the beseiged French garrison under General Vaubois. 
By the time one of the czar's generals, Baron Sprengporten, could 
go out with the intention of becoming its Russian governor, Malta 
had been occupied by the British. No Russians would be allowed to 
land; nor indeed had any Russians assisted in the insurrection; their 
assistance in Malta was no longer needed, least of all by the British. 
Russia's absence from Maltese shores at a time when its presence 
was being solicited by Admiral Nelson, at least formally, brings to 
mind a later notable passivity or hesitancy: that's when Mussolini's 
well-equipped Italian navy did not sail to take a largely undefended 
Malta in June 1940. By the time an Italo-German invasion plan was 
hatched, circumstances had changed remarkably.22 
Twists and turns in policy, for which Paull's reign is known, clearly 
were not a monopoly of the Russian throne. Whether Paul really wanted 
Malta at all or not, his burning desire to see her restituted to the Order of 
St John did become a distinct possibility shortly after his own macabre 
assassination. More than anyone else, he surely had prepared the path 
for it. Article X of the Treaty of Amiens in 1802 prescribed that Malta 
would return to the Order under the protection of the Great Powers, 
including Russia, subject to certain conditions. The British held they 
would rather see Russia present there than France, if peace could thus 
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be achieved and assured. 
By 1803, however, Napoleon's behaviour and their second 
thoughts made them change their mind again. Instead of evacuating 
their forces, they decided that they would stay in Malta themselves, 
alone, indefinitely - an occupation that was not internationally consented 
to before the Treaty of Paris in 1814 and ratified at Vienna in the following 
year. By that same dispensation, the Ionian Islands also went to Britain, 
mistress of the seas. Paul's son and successor, Alexander I, renounced 
to the grand mastership of the Order on assuming the throne in 1801, 
and the Pope had by then named a successor to Hompesch.23 
The Order may have been granted a reprieve through Czar Paull's 
protection when it most needed support, but it still ended up wandering 
from place to place, sometimes haltingly, until it eventually quartered 
and settled on a site in Rome, where it thrives to this day, responsible for 
many philanthropic activities throughout the world. More recently it has 
revived some of its historic associations with Malta, a sovereign state in 
her own right since 1964, when the British flag was finally lowered. 
Paull's reign has been the subject of various studies, old and new. 
His Malta focus was a rather central one, but it needs to be seen in a 
broader context. The two overriding factors would seem to have been 
the growing Russian naval and mercantile interests in the Mediterranean 
region, about which Norman Saul has written,24 mingled with the 
fascination exerted by an order of chivalry epitomizing Christendom 
which over the centuries confronted the spread of Ottoman power and 
of Islam.2s At the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, 
a third underlying factor was the threatening revolutionary republican 
upsurge, leading to widespread warfare and continental upheaval, a 
perfect antithesis to what the Knights of Malta had represented in their 
quaint citadels, where they too were elitist and despotic after all. 
One biographer has seen Paul I as the first of a series of Russian 
rulers attempting "to cope with a radically modernizing world through an 
essentially conservative ideology".26 Others, in search of coherence or 
rationality, have been more inclined to be dismissive.27 
In so far as Maltese-Russian relations are concerned, these were 
never so close as they were during his reign but, certainly, without being 
limited to it, before or after (as could be seen from an excellent exhibition 
mounted some years ago by the Valletta-based Russian cultural centre 
at the President's palace). Two of the Order of St John's most precious 
icons brought to Malta from Rhodes - that of Our Lady of Philermos, 
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which used to be housed in the chapel of the conventual church; and the 
baptizing hand of St John the Baptist, which was placed in that church's 
oratory - were sent to Russia after the fall of Malta to Napoleon. 
Writing in 1999, the Cambridge historian Riley-Smith noted that 
these were later transferred to Belgrade and are now in Montenegro.28 
Perhaps in time - without being disparaging to Islam - they might be 
regarded as a reconciliatory offering to Catholic-Orthodox exchanges 
over the years. 
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